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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We develop a quantitative theory of entrepreneurship, income inequality, and financial 
frictions disciplined with household data from Brazil. The theory extends Lucas (1978) by modeling 
heterogeneity in two skills: -working and managerial skills. Consistently with the evidence,  the 
theory implies three occupational categories: workers, employers, and self-employed entrepreneurs. 
We find that the removal of financial frictions decreases self-employment rates from 24% to 11% 
(with small effects on the number of employers), increases aggregate output by 48%, and has non- 
trivial effects on the distribution of income. We also find that while most households benefit from a 
reform that eliminates enforcement problems,  the majority of employers (about two thirds) lose 
from  the  reform.  By  depressing  the  demand  for  labor,  limited  enforcement depresses   the 
equilibrium wage rate, increasing the profits of employers. Our theory thus suggests that employers 
in Brazil may have a vested interested in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement. 
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1    Introduction 
 
 
A recent literature has emphasized that the misallocation of resources caused by financial 
frictions depress total factor productivity and, hence, output per worker (Erosa (2001), Jeong 
and Townsend (2007), Amaral and Quintin (2010), Buera and Shin (2011), Buera et al. (2011), 
Greenwood et al. (2010)). The standard approach in the financial frictions literature and, more 
generally in the misallocation literature (see Guner et al. (2008), and Restuccia and Rogerson 
(2008)) is to calibrate the model to micro data from the United States and use the calibrated 
model economy to simulate policy distortions in developing countries.1 While this approach 
has the advantage that the US data is readily available, it relies on the assumption that the 
distribution of entrepreneurial skills or plant productivities are invariant across countries or, at 
the very least, do not matter for the misallocation of resources induced by policy distortions or 
limited enforcement in the financial markets. However, there is ample evidence suggesting that 
the distribution of skills do vary across rich and poor countries.2 Moreover, economic theory 
suggests that inequality matters for the impact of micro distortions and financial frictions (see 
Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993)). 
We develop a quantitative theory of entrepreneurship, income inequality, and financial 
frictions disciplined with household level data from Brazil. The theory is used to quantita- 
tively evaluate the impact of financial frictions on occupational decisions, resource allocation, 
aggregate output, and economic inequality. Conversely, we study how economic inequality 
shapes the impact of financial frictions in the economy. Our paper contributes to a seminal 
(mostly theoretical) literature that has emphasized the importance of the interaction between 
the distribution of wealth and financial frictions for the allocation of resources. Moreover, 
we use our theory of inequality to quantitatively assess the distribution of welfare gains and 
losses from eliminating financial frictions in the economy. 
The key innovation of our theory is to extend the Lucas (1978) model in order to incorpo- 
rate heterogeneity in two skills: −working and managerial skills. By modeling heterogeneity 
in two skills the theory can distinguish between comparative advantage in entrepreneurship 
(a high ratio of managerial to working skills) and absolute advantage (a high value of both 
skills).   This distinction is necessary for the theory to be consistent with evidence on the 
1Notable exceptions are given by Midrigan and Xu (2010) and Garc´ıa-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2012) 
2In fact, even among developed economies, recent work on international trade theory argues that the 
heterogeneity in the (second moments of the ) skill distribution plays an important role for understanding 
trade patterns among similarly endowed economies (see Ohnsorge and Trefler (2007) and references in that 
paper). 
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income distribution across occupations in Brazil. In particular, the ratio of median earnings 
between entrepreneurs and workers in Brazil is equal to one, which implies that the median 
entrepreneur in the Brazilian data does not make higher earnings than the median worker. 
This implication is grossly at odds with the predominant one-skill model developed in the 
occupational choice literature. 
By assuming that entrepreneurs can use their working and managerial skills in the oper- 
ation of their businesses, our theory has the novel implication that some entrepreneurs will 
not hire any outside labor and be own account workers (or self-employed entrepreneurs). 
Building a theory that distinguishes between entrepreneurs that are employers and those that 
are self-employed is important because there is abundant evidence that the high rates of en- 
trepreneurship in poor countries is mostly due to the prevalence of self-employed workers (see 
Figure 2). In fact, the high rates of self-employment is an important feature of the Brazilian 
data and, our findings, imply that self-employment is important for understanding the impact 
of financial frictions in Brazil. 
We assume a small open economy that takes as given the international interest rate. 
Following Buera et al. (2011), capital market imperfections are introduced by modeling an 
endogenous borrowing constraint that limits the amount of capital that entrepreneurs can use. 
We prove that in the absence of financial frictions occupational choices are driven entirely 
by the ratio of managerial to working skills.  Employers have a comparative advantage at 
managing (high zm ), workers have a comparative advantage at working (low zm ), and self- 
zw zw 
employed have an intermediate skill ratio. Heterogeneity in absolute advantage implies that 
both at the top and bottom of the income distribution there are entrepreneurs and workers. 
We characterize how capital market imperfections distort rates of returns on skills by making 
the return to managerial and working skills depend on asset holdings. We show that financial 
frictions have a non-trivial impact on inequality: On the one hand, they lead to higher and 
persistent inequality by generating variation in returns to skills and by making these returns 
depend on asset holdings. On the other hand, since borrowing constraints tend to be tighter for 
highly skill than for low skill individuals, financial frictions reduce inequality by diminishing 
the rents obtained by highly skilled individuals relative to a situation with perfect capital 
markets. 
The model economy is calibrated to Brazilian household data and macro aggregates. Brazil 
provides a nice benchmark because it is a country that exhibits both high levels of economic 
inequality and of financial frictions. We simulate the effects of removing financial frictions in 
the calibrated model economy. We find a large drop in the rates of entrepreneurship (from 33% 
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to 18%), which is mostly due to a decrease in self-employment. While the self-employment 
rate decreases from 24% to 11%, the fraction of employers only drops by about 2 percentage 
points. The gain in aggregate output amounts to 48%. There are also sizable changes in the 
sectorial composition of output. Production by employers increase by 64% whereas production 
of the self-employed decreases by 53%. TFP in the economy increased by 24%, with this gain 
being larger than the TFP gain among self-employed (9%) and that among employers (16%). 
The share of aggregate capital used by the self-employed drops from 19% to 4%. Because 
employers tend to have a higher managerial ability than self-employed entrepreneurs, the 
reallocation of capital between these two groups enhances the aggregate productivity gains of 
removing financial frictions. 
We also simulate the impact of removing financial frictions when self-employment is shut 
down in the baseline economy. We find that the output gain is 53%, which is higher than the 
48% increase obtained in the baseline economy. Hence, self-employment decreases the negative 
impact of financial frictions on aggregate output. This finding can be explained as follows: 
Financial frictions make it hard for young and talented entrepreneurs (individuals with high 
managerial skills) to raise external funds. This effect is compounded by the fact that financial 
frictions depress the equilibrium real wage, which makes it difficult to accumulate savings 
by working for a paid wage when young. Self-employment allows talented entrepreneurs to 
circumvent the low wage and build up savings, diminishing the negative impact of financial 
frictions on aggregate output. Hence, our findings implies that self-employment diminishes 
the impact of financial frictions by being a pathway towards becoming an employer. The 
occupational transitions in the Brazilian household data support this prediction of the theory: 
Self-employed individuals are three times more likely to become employers than paid workers 
and about 40% of transitions into employer between two consecutive years are coming directly 
from self-employment. Our baseline economy matches these facts remarkably closely. 
Financial frictions have important effects on the sources of income inequality and on its 
persistence over time. We divide household income between capital income and labor in- 
come, with labor income defined as the sum of the returns to working and managerial skill 
inputs. Surprisingly, we find that capital market imperfections have opposing effects on the 
concentration of labor income and capital income. Labor income is more evenly distributed in 
the economy with imperfect capital markets than in the economy with no financial frictions 
(with a Gini index of .52 versus a Gini index .56 in the latter economy). This is because 
financial frictions depress the rents earn by highly able entrepreneurs relative to an economy 
with perfect capital markets .  On the other hand, the Gini index of capital income is about 
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10 percentage points higher in the economy with imperfect credit markets. Financial frictions 
imply that the returns to managerial ability are positively correlated with capital income. The 
correlation between capital and labor income is equal to 0.80 in the baseline economy, which 
is much larger than the 0.50 value in the economy with perfect capital markets. This effect 
explains why income inequality is also more persistent in the economy with financial frictions. 
The skill distribution matters importantly for the impact of  financial  frictions.  This  is 
shown by recalibrating two new economies in which the correlation between working and 
managerial skills is set exogenously to a high (0.8) and a low (-0.8) value (the calibration of 
the baseline economy implies a skill correlation of 0.1). We find that the output and TFP 
gains of improving credit market institutions are large in all economies but vary substantially 
across the three calibrated model economies. The output gains range from 36% to 55% and 
the TFP gains range from 22% to 31% as the correlation between skills decreases. The skill 
correlation determines the extent to which talented entrepreneurs are able to self-finance their 
businesses. When the correlation between these two skills is high, individuals that are talented 
as entrepreneurs are also talented as workers. Then, if skills are also persistent over time, 
young and talented individuals can work when young, build savings, and use their savings 
to finance their businesses when old. Thus, when managerial and working skills are highly 
correlated and persistent over time, the effects of financial frictions on resource allocations are 
less important than otherwise. 
Given that financial frictions are so detrimental for the efficient allocation of productive 
resources and aggregate output, one question that rises is why countries set up institutions 
causing financial frictions and why these institutions are so persistent. Acemoglu and Robin- 
son (2012) provided many historical accounts of how political power determines economic 
institutions and, in turn, how political power is shaped by the political institutions and the 
distribution of resources in society. Given that our theory of inequality was calibrated to 
Brazilian household data we can gain some insights into the political economy of capital mar- 
ket imperfections by studying the welfare gains and losses of reforming capital markets in 
our calibrated model economy. We assume that the economy is in steady state and that 
suddenly there is a once and for all reform that makes the enforcement of credit contracts 
perfect. We find that the financial reform has non-trivial effects on the distribution of in- 
come and that occupational choices are crucial for understanding how the reform impacts on 
individuals. Keeping fixed the occupational choices of the initial steady state, workers gain 
with the reform since the wage rate increase. Self-employed also gain since they can borrow 
more. Unconstrained employers loose since wage payments go up but their managerial rents 
5  
do not increase. Constrained employers may gain or loose depending on whether the increase 
in managerial rents outweighs the increase in wages. Since the increase in managerial rents is 
likely to be more important for talented entrepreneurs, these entrepreneurs are more likely to 
see their income increase. The untalented entrepreneurs who were operating businesses prior 
to the reform are likely to see their income go down and to switch occupations. 
We find that while the vast majority of households gain from the reform, about 8.7% of 
the population see their welfare decrease with the reform. Households that lose from the 
reform tend to be older, richer, and exhibit higher managerial skills and lower working skills 
than households that support the reform. These findings are just reflecting that occupational 
choices are crucial for understanding the political economy of the reform: Among the house- 
holds that are worse off with the reform, about 93% of them would have been entrepreneurs on 
the period of the reform had the reform not taken place, and 66% would have been employers. 
Employers are a positive selection from the population distribution of managerial skills. Then, 
the fact that about two thirds of those who oppose the reform are employers explains why 
the managerial ability of those supporting the reform is higher than that of those opposing 
the reform. Nonetheless, not all employers support the reform: About 36% of employers in 
the initial equilibrium benefit from the elimination of enforcement problems. We find that 
the employers benefiting from the reform tend to be of higher managerial ability than those 
who oppose it. The reason is that high ability employers are more likely to be borrowing 
constrained than low ability entrepreneurs. As a result, they are more likely to operate at an 
inefficient scale and to gain more from the elimination of enforcement problems. On the other 
hand, the financial reform hurts many of the lower skill employers and force them to change 
their occupation status: About 46% of the entrepreneurs that oppose to the reform and would 
have been employers had the reform not taken place, do not hire any labor after the reform 
(most of them become self-employed after the reform). The wage hike after the reform makes 
it unprofitable for these entrepreneurs to hire outside labor. 
Summing up, while most households benefit from a reform that eliminates enforcement 
problems, the majority of employers (about two thirds) lose from the reform. By depressing 
the demand for labor, limited enforcement depresses the equilibrium wage rate, increasing the 
profits of employers. Our theory thus suggests that employers may have a vested interested 
in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement. 
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents some facts on entrepreneurship and 
economic inequality in Brazil. Section 3 presents the model economy. Section 4 presents some 
analytical results characterizing how financial frictions affects occupational choice decisions, 
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rates of returns to skills, and inequality. Section 5 calibrates the model economy, evaluates the 
performance of the model economy, and assesses the effects of removing financial frictions on 
occupational choices, aggregate output, and income inequality. This section also discusses how 
changes in the correlation of skills affect the impact of financial frictions on aggregate output. 
The paper ends with a discussion of the political economy of removing financial frictions in 
Brazil. 
 
 
2 Evidence 
 
 
We now document some facts on occupations and economic inequality in Brazil that guide 
the theory developed in this paper. The facts are based on data from the Pesquisa Mensal de 
Emprego (PME) and from the Pesquisa de Ornamentos Familiares (POF). The former is a 
monthly household employment survey, with a similar structure to the US Current Population 
Survey (CPS). The latter is a survey of household consumption and income. Appendix A 
describes how the data set used in this paper was constructed. 
 
 
Income inequality Figure 1 presents data on the variance of log-income over the life cycle 
from the PME (similar findings arise from the POF). First, note that the variance of log-income 
at age 20 is 0.55, which is much higher than the value of 0.30 documented by Storesletten et 
al. (2005) for the United States. Thus, households in Brazil are quite heterogeneous at young 
ages. As in the United States, inequality in income grows during the life cycle suggesting the 
presence of persistent shocks to household earnings. By age 55, household log-income reaches 
a value of 1.01. 
 
Occupational structure We define the occupation of a household as that of the household 
head. We consider two broad occupations − workers and entrepreneurs. Moreover, we further 
subdivide the entrepreneurial occupation in two classes − employers and own account workers 
(self-employed). Figure 2 uses data from the ILO to analyze occupational structure in different 
countries. The blue bar on Figure 2 shows the proportion of workers, the orange bar the 
proportion of self-employed, and the green bar the proportion of employers.3 The evidence 
shows that developed countries have lower amount of entrepreneurs than developing countries, 
but this data pattern is driven by the lower proportion of self-employed in developed countries. 
The proportion of employers in the population of households is quite similar among countries. 
 
3For Canada and the United States, the ILO does not distinguish between self-employed and employers so 
that the orange bar is the sum of the two. 
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While in Brazil workers represent about 73% of households, in Germany they are about 89%. 
The high proportion of entrepreneurial households in Brazil is explained by self-employed 
households which represent about 22% of the labour force in Brazil, much lower than the 
6% of self-employed households in Germany. The fraction of employers is roughly equal 
across these two countries (about 5%). Employers and self-employed are quite different in 
their average income: On average employers earn about 3 times as much as self-employed 
households. Moreover, self-employed earn less than the average worker. 
 
 
Distribution of earnings by occupation We show two graphs on the  distribution  of 
earnings by occupation: The first one shows the distribution of earnings for workers and 
entrepreneurs, the second one shows the earnings for entrepreneurs partitioned between self- 
employed and employers. Figure 3 shows that the distribution of earnings of entrepreneurs 
is flatter than the one of workers, having a bigger mass of people with low earnings but also 
a bigger mass of households with high earnings. Thus, earnings are more dispersed among 
entrepreneurs than workers. If we further divide the Entrepreneurs in Self-Employed and 
Employers we can see that the first group is the one that has more mass in the lower tail of 
earnings. Figure 4 shows that Self-Employment is the occupation with the lowest expected 
returns, while Employer is the one with the highest expected returns. 
 
Summarizing, we draw the following lessons from the above facts: 
 
1. Income inequality in Brazil is high relative to the US, which underscores the importance 
of calibrating the model to Brazilian micro data. Brazilian households are highly het- 
erogeneous early in the life cycle and inequality grows substantially with age. These 
observations suggests the importance of modeling heterogeneity in fixed effects (perma- 
nent skill heterogeneity) as well as persistent shocks to skills. 
 
2. The fact that both wages and entrepreneurial income are highly dispersed, motivates us 
to build a model with two dimensional skill heterogeneity. 
 
3. It is important to build a theory that distinguishes between employers and self-employed 
entrepreneurs since most entrepreneurial households in Brazil are self-employed (or own- 
account workers) households and distribution of income differ substantially across both 
categories of entrepreneurs. While mean income of employers is much higher than that 
of self-employed households, there is substantial income heterogeneity within each of 
these occupational categories. 
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4. The variation in the rates of entrepreneurship between Brazil and rich countries is en- 
tirely explained by the high rates of self-employment in Brazil, a fact that existing 
theories of occupational choice cannot account for. 
 
 
3 The Model 
 
We consider a small open economy in steady state. The model features a one sector life- 
cycle growth model in which households are heterogeneous in two skills − working (zw ) and 
managerial abilities (zm). Skills evolve stochastically over the life cycle and there are no in- 
surance markets to insure ability risk. Production is organized by entrepreneurs who combine 
managerial, capital, and labor inputs. As in Lucas (1978), entrepreneurs can only use their 
own managerial skills since there is no markets for managers. In each period households 
choose their occupation: whether to work for a wage or to operate a business and become en- 
trepreneurs. Occupational choices are based on their comparative advantage as entrepreneurs 
and their access to capital. Following Buera et al. (2011), access to capital is limited by 
their wealth through an endogenous collateral constraint that arises because of enforcement 
problems. In order to match important aspects of the Brazilian micro data, the Lucas (1978) 
model is extended to distinguish between two types of entrepreneurial households − employers 
and self-employed households. 
 
 
Population The economy is populated by overlapping generations, each generation consist- 
ing of a continuum of households. Households are born at age 20, retire at age 60, and die with 
certainty at age 75. Each households is endowed with one unit of time at every age. Before 
the retirement age, households decide how much of their time to allocate to working (tw ) or 
to managerial (tm) activities. Households differ in working (zw ) and managerial (zm) abilities. 
The logarithm of skills evolve stochastically over the life cycle according to (household i at 
age t) 
 
ln(zwit)  =  βw Xt + αwi + uwit, 
ln(zmit)  =  βmXt + αmi + umit, 
where zwit (zmit )denote the working (managerial) skills of household i at age t, Xt represents 
a quartic polynomio of age, αwi and αmi represent household fixed effects on working and 
managerial productivities, and uwit and umit are life cycle shocks received at age t by household 
i. We assume that the fixed effects are drawn from a bi-variate normal distribution at the 
first period of life of the household (age 20): 
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where ρ is the correlation between the two fixed effects across individuals.  The mean fixed 
effect of the distribution of working skills is normalized to 0. 
The life-cycle shocks follow the stochastic process 
 
 
ujit = ρj ujit−1 + Ejit, for j = w, m, 
 
with Et = (Ewt, Emt) jointly drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with correlation coeffi- 
cient corr(Ewt, Emt) = ρ. We further assume that αji and ujit are mutually orthogonal. 
The assumptions made imply that distribution of skills at age-t is log-normally distributed 
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Production technology Following Lucas (1978), output is produced with a constant re- 
turns to scale production technology in managerial, labor, and capital inputs. Entrepreneurs 
can only use their managerial input because there is no market for managers. The supply 
of the managerial input is equal to the product of the households’ managerial ability (zm) 
and the time devoted to managing a business (tm). The output produced by a household 
supplying m = zmtm units of managerial input and using k units of capital and n efficiency 
units of labor is: 
Y (m, k, n) = mγ kν nθ , where γ + ν + θ = 1. (1) 
The time allocation decision of entrepreneurs (tm ∈ [0, 1]) is modeled to introduced self- 
employment in the Lucas (1978) framework. When 0 < tm < 1 entrepreneurs supply both 
managerial and labor inputs to their own businesses. Specifically, the labor input supplied 
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d 
by entrepreneurs to their business is equal to the product of their working ability (zw ) and 
the time devoted to non-managerial activities (1 − tm). The total labor input used by an 
entrepreneur is the sum of the labor supplied by the entrepreneur ((1 − tm)zw ) and the labor 
hired in the market (nd) from workers outside the family: 
 
n = nd + (1 − tm)zw , (2) 
 
where zw is the working ability of the household. We denote as entrepreneurs the households 
that choose tm > 0. Entrepreneurs, in turn, are partitioned in two subgroups depending on 
whether they hire outside labor or not. The first subgroup is given by the employers, who are 
those entrepreneurs hiring labor outside the family (nd > 0) . We assume that entrepreneurs 
that hire outside labor incur a fixed per period operating cost of cf .4 The second subgroup 
are those entrepreneurs that only use their own household labor input (n = (1 − tm)zw and 
nd = 0). Workers are those households who use all their available time as workers (tm = 0, 
obtaining labor earnings wzw ). 
Summarizing, entrepreneurs produce output with a production technology that combines 
capital, labor, and managerial inputs. The key distinguishing feature between employers and 
self-employed is that the latter do not hire labor outside the household and that employers 
pay a fixed cost in each period of business operation. They both solve a time-allocation 
problem regarding the fraction of their time endowment used to supply managerial versus 
working skills. Below, we shall characterize how entrepreneurs optimally choose the time (tm) 
dedicated to the supply of managerial skills. 
 
Capital markets We assume that the financial intermediation industry is competitive. 
Intermediaries take deposits from households and pay the international interest rate r. They 
rent capital to entrepreneurs at a rate r + δ and loan employers the fixed cost of operation cf . 
Enforcement problems limit the amount of borrowing and the capital rented to entrepreneurs. 
Following Buera et al. (2011), entrepreneurs may renege on the contracts after production has 
taken place and keep a fraction 1 − φ of undepreciated capital and the revenue net of labor 
payments (Y (m, k, n) − wnd + (1 − δ)k − cf In >0) but lose the financial assets a deposited 
with the intermediary. Entrepreneurs that default regain access to the financial markets the 
following period. The parameter φ ∈ [0, 1] indexes the strength of the legal institutions in 
the economy, with φ = 1 indicating perfect financial markets and φ = 0 corresponding to an 
economy with no credit markets. We study equilibria in which financial contracts are restricted 
 
4The fixed cost is introduced so that employers demand a non-trivial amount of labor (an amount bounded 
away from zero), thereby making the distinction between self-employed and employer meaningful. 
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≡ d 
≥ − d 
k 
so that there is no default in equilibrium. This occurs when the amount of capital rented is 
limited by the largest amount k(a, zm, zw ; φ) consistent with entrepreneurs choosing to abide 
by their financial contracts. To characterize rental limits, consider the profit maximization 
problem of entrepreneurs that take as given the capital k used in the business operation: 
 
π(zm, zw , a; k) max 
m,n,nd,tm 
{mγ kν nθ − wnd − r(k − a) + a − δk − cf In >0} (3) 
subject to 
 
m = tmzm, (4) 
n = (1 − tm) ∗ zw + nd, (5) 
where tm ∈ [0, 1], nd ≥ 0, k given. (6) 
 
 
 
The following proposition extends results in Buera et al. (2011) to characterize the rental 
limits k(a, zm, zw ; φ). 
 
Proposition 1   Capital rental k by an entrepreneur with wealth a and skills (zm, zw ) is 
enforceable if and only if 
 
π(zm, zw , a; k) (1 φ) max 
m,n,nd,tm 
subject to 
 
m = tmzm, 
{mγ kν nθ − wnd + (1 − δ)k − cf In >0} 
n = (1 − tm) ∗ zw + nd, 
where tm ∈ [0, 1], nd ≥ 0. 
 
The upper bound on capital rental that is consistent with entrepreneurs choosing to abide by 
their contracts can be represented by a function k(a, zm, zw ; φ), which is increasing in a, zm, zw 
and φ. 
Proof.  See appendix. 
 
 
The income of an entrepreneur in state (zm, zw , a) making optimal production decisions 
given prices and borrowing limits is given by 
ye(zm, zw , a)   ≡  max{π(zm, zw , a; k)} (7) 
 
subject to 
k ≤ k(a, zm, zw ; φ) (8) 
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m = 
The income of a household that choose to work for a wage is yw (zm, zw , a) = wzw + ra. 
Household income is the maximum between the entrepreneurial and workers income: 
 
y(zm, zw , a) = max{ye(zm, zw , a), yw (zm, zw , a)}. (9) 
Households maximize expected discounted lifetime utility 
 
max 
cj ,aj+1 
 
subject to 
J   
{ 
j=1 
 
β j U (cj )} 
 
cj  + aj+1 = y(zmj , zwj , aj ), 
cj , aj+1 ≥ 0, 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Time Allocation and Occupational Maps 
 
 
We now study in partial equilibrium (e.g. for a fixed wage rate) how our theory can give rise 
to three active occupational choices: workers, self-employed, and employers. We show that 
when capital markets are perfect occupational choices are entirely determined by the ability 
ratio  zw .  Individuals with a high  zw ratio have a comparative advantage at working and 
zm zm 
choose to become workers, individuals with a low zw 
m 
ratio have a comparative advantage at 
entrepreneurship and choose to become employers, and those with intermediate skill ratios 
prefer to be self-employed. We also characterize how tight borrowing constraints (capital 
market imperfections) distort occupational choices. 
We start by analyzing the determinants of self-employment income. Self-employed indi- 
viduals choose how much time to allocate to managerial versus working activities and how 
much capital to use in production. Using the linear homogeneity of the production function, 
the income of a self-employed individual with a units of assets who uses k units of capital can 
be written as 
yse = M P tm tm + M P tw tw + M P K k + ra − k(r + δ), 
 
where M P tm and M P tw denote the marginal products of managerial time and working time, 
respectively, and MPK represents the marginal product of capital. We are now ready to prove 
the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2 (Self-employment) The optimal time devoted to management by self- 
employed entrepreneurs (entrepreneurs not hiring outside labor) is t∗ γ 
γ+θ . The marginal 
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where rmw   = γ ν −       θ 
 
 
( ) 
( ) 
zm 
( ) 
w 
z 
product of their time is equated across its two uses (managerial and working time) and satisfies: 
 
  1   M P Tse = rmw   zγ zθ   γ+θ , 
m  w 
 
  θ  
ν 1−ν 
1   ν
γ 
  
1
 
r+δ+µ 
  ν  
1−ν 
 
is the rate of return to the composite skill input 
(
zγ
   1   
θ  γ+θ and µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint. The income mzw 
)
 
of a self-employed individual with assets a is given by 
 
  1   yse = rmw   zγ zθ   γ+θ  + µk + ra, 
m  w 
 
where k = k(zm, zw , a). 
Proof.  See appendix. 
 
Proposition 2 establishes that self-employed individuals equate the marginal product of 
the time allocated to managing and to working tasks.   The marginal product of the self- 
  1   employment time can be expressed as the product of the skill composite   zγ zθ    γ+θ   and the 
m  w   1   
rate of return rmw . The skill composite 
(
zγ zθ 
) 
γ+θ  is a geometric average of the managerial 
m  w 
and working abilities of the self-employed individual. The return to the skill composite ( 
rmw ) depends on parameters of the production technology, the real interest rate (r), and the 
Lagrange multiplier (µ) associated to the borrowing constraint. Note that the return to the 
skill composite decreases with (µ). Hence, borrowing constraints generate heterogeneity in 
rate of returns to skills among self-employed individuals. 
Since workers’ income is given by 
 
 
yw = wzw + ra, 
 
it is immediate that yse − yw is independent of asset holdings. Hence, as shown in Proposition 
3, when µ = 0 the decision of whether to work for a wage or to be self-employed only depends 
on the ability ratio zw . On the contrary, when the borrowing constraint binds k = k(zm, zw , a) 
occupational choice decisions depend on asset holdings because they affect the rate of return 
  1   to skills (e.g. the composite input  zγ zθ   γ+θ ) and the rate of return to assets. These results 
m  w 
are summarized in Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3 (Self-employed vs Worker) Let R1 ≡ 
( rmw ) 
θ+γ 
γ , where rmw is defined 
in Proposition 2. Then, 
 
1. If capital markets are perfect (φ = 1), working for a wage is preferred to self-employment 
if and only if zw 
m 
> R1. 
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2. If capital markets are imperfect (φ < 1), working for a wage is preferred to self- 
employment if and only if 
 ( 
γ
 
 
  1   θ 
 
θ+γ 
γ    
zw  > 
rmw + µk/ 
m 
 
w
 
zmzw 
γ+θ 
 ≡ R1, 
 
where µ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint and k = 
k(zm, zw , a). 
 
 
When capital markets are perfect (φ = 1), the occupational choice decision between work- 
ing for a wage or being self-employed can be represented by a ray R1 that goes through the 
origin in (zm, zw ) space. Individuals with ability above this ray prefer to be a worker. In 
this case, occupational choice decisions are independent of asset holdings and maximize the 
marginal product of time. However, when capital markets are imperfect, occupational choice 
decisions depend on asset holdings and do not maximize the marginal product of time. The 
occupational choice between working and self-employment is now described by the curve R1 
in (zm, zw ) space. Note that a proportional change in both skills decreases the income ratio 
yw because the increase in zm leads to a tighter borrowing constraint for a fixed asset level a, 
implying that the curve R1 tilts down relatively to the ray R1 as zm increases. An increase 
in assets (a) relaxes the borrowing constraint (µ decreases and rmw increases) making it more 
likely that individuals will choose self-employment so that the position of the R1 depends on 
asset holdings. 
 
 
We now analyze the decisions of employers. Employers choose how much of their time to 
allocate to managerial versus working activities and how much capital (k) and (outside) labor 
services (nd) to use in production. Using the linear homogeneity of the production function 
the income of an employer with a units of assets can be written as 
 
 
ye = M P tm tm + M P tw tw + M P nd nd + M P K k + ra − k(r + δ) − w nd − cf , 
 
where M P tm and M P tw denote the marginal products of managerial time and working time, 
respectively, and M P K and M P nd represent the marginal product of capital and labor ser- 
vices. We are now ready to prove the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4 (Employers) 
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m 
  
(r+δ+µ) 
z 
1. The optimal time devoted to management by employers is t∗ = min 
{
tˆm, 1
r
, where tˆ∗ ≡ ( 
zγ k(a,zm 
 
,zw 
     1   
ν θ−1   1−θ−γ 
w 
 
.  Moreover, denoting by ku(zm, zw ) the level of capital 
w γ 
chosen by an unconstrained entrepreneur with ability (zm, zw ), there exist a∗(zm, zw ) < 
ku(zm, zw ) such that t∗ = 1 for all a ≥ a∗(zm, zw ). 
 
2. The marginal product of employer’s time satisfies: 
 
M P Te = zmrm ≥ zw w(with strict inequality if tm = 1), 
 
      ν              1   
θ    1−(ν+θ) 
where rm = γ 
r 
ν 
( θ ) w is the rate of return to the managerial input zm 
and µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint. 
 
3. The income of an employer with ability (zm, zw ) with assets a is given by 
 
ye = zmrm + µk + ra − cf , 
 
where k = k(zm, zw , a) 
Proof. See appendix. 
Proposition 4 states that there is a threshold level of asset holdings a∗(zm, zw ) such that for 
assets below this level the marginal product of entrepreneurial time is equal to wzw and the 
time allocation problem of the employer features an interior solution in which the employer 
performs both managing and working activities. If asset holdings are higher than the threshold 
a∗(zm, zw ), then the marginal product of entrepreneurial time is higher than that as a worker 
and the time allocation problem exhibits a corner solution tm = 1. 
The marginal product of employers’ time (MPT˙m) can be expressed as the product of 
managerial skills zm and the rate of return rm on the employer’s managerial skill. The rate 
of return (rm) depends on parameters of the production technology, the real interest rate (r), 
and the Lagrange multiplier (µ) associated to the borrowing constraint. Note that borrowing 
constraints (µ) generate heterogeneity in rate of returns to skills among employers. 
Proposition 4 shows that when capital markets are perfect ( µ = 0) then the marginal prod- 
uct of employer’s time is proportional to her managerial ability zm and the income difference 
between being an employer and being self-employed ye − yse  is independent of asset holdings. 
In this case, Proposition 5 shows that the decision of whether to be an employer or to be 
self-employed only depends on the ability ratio zw , provided the fixed cost of operation faced 
m 
by employers is equal to zero (cf = 0). There exist a constant ratio R2 such that individuals 
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zm 
with a skill ratio zw 
m 
below R2 choose to be an employer. When the fixed cost of operation is 
positive, then the occupational choice decision depends on comparative advantage (skill ratio 
zm ) and on the absolute level of managerial ability zm. Now, to be an employer rather than 
self-employed the ability vector (zm, zw ) should satisfy zw < R2(1 − 
cf 
zmrmw 
γ+θ 
) θ    . Intuitively, in 
the presence of fixed cost of being an employer, employers need a minimum level of managerial 
ability zm in order to recoup the fixed cost of operation. The occupational choice decision 
between employer and self-employment is not only based on the skill ratio. 
When capital markets are imperfect and borrowing constraints bind, occupational choice 
decisions depend on asset holdings because both the marginal product of time and the return 
to capital of both employed and self-employed individuals depend on their asset holdings (see 
Proposition 5). Intuitively, an increase in asset holdings increases the employer region in the 
occupational map in (zw , zm) relative to the self-employment (R2 in Proposition 5 shifts up). 
The key is that borrowing constraints tend to be tighter for employers than self-employed 
since employers need to operate at a larger scale. 
 
Proposition 5 (Employer versus Self-employment) Let R2 ≡ 
  1   
   
rm   
  
rmw 
 
θ+γ 
θ 
 
 
, where rmw 
and rm are the rate of returns to the skill composite 
(
zγ zθ 
) 
γ+θ  and the managerial skill defined 
m  w 
in Propositions 2 and 4, respectively. Then, 
 
1. If capital markets are perfect (φ = 1), individuals prefer to become employers relative to 
self-employment when the ability ratio is such that zw 
m 
< R2(1 − 
cf 
zmrmw 
θ+γ 
) θ   . 
 
2. If capital markets are imperfect (φ < 1), individuals prefer to become employers relative 
to self-employment when the ability ratio is such that 
zw 
( 
rm 
< 
zm rmw 
(µeke −cf ) 
zmrmw 
(µsekse) 
1
 
zmrmw 
 
θ+γ 
θ 
   
≡ R2, 
 
where µe and µse are the Lagrange  multipliers  associated  to  the  borrowing  constraints 
when the individual is an employer or is self-employed, respectively, and ke and kse are 
the capital used in production at these occupations. 
 
 
Proposition 6 collects results characterizing occupational choice decisions when capital 
markets are perfect (φ = 1). If the fixed cost of operation of employers is cf = 0, occupa- 
tional choices are only determined by the ability ratio zw . Depending on parameter values 
m 
(equilibrium returns to ability), the equilibrium may feature self-employed individuals or not. 
If equilibrium prices are such that R1 > R2, then individuals with an ability ratio zw > R1 
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work for a wage, individuals with R1 > zw > R2 are self-employed, and those with zw < R2 
are employers.  A positive fixed cost of operation (cf  > 0), implies that employers require a 
minimum scale in order to operate a profitable business so that the decision to be an employer 
depends both on the skill ratio R1 > zw > R2 and on the level of managerial ability zm. 
 
Proposition 6 (Occupational maps when capital markets are perfect (φ = 1) 
Assume that φ = 1. Let R1 ≡ 
( rmw ) θ+γ r γ and R2 ≡ m 
θ+γ 
θ 
 
, where rmw  and rm are the rate 
w 
  1   
rmw 
of returns to the skill composite 
(
zγ zθ 
) 
γ+θ  and the managerial skill defined in Propositions 2 
m  w 
and 4, respectively. 
 
1. If there are no fixed cost of operation of being an employer (cf = 0), then the optimal 
occupational choice is the one that maximizes the marginal product of time and is only 
determined by the skill ratio ( zw ) as follows: 
m 
 
(a) If equilibrium prices are such that R1 > R2, then individuals with an ability ratio 
zm  > R1 work for a wage, individuals with R1 > zm  > R2 are self-employed, and 
those with zw 
m 
< R2 are employers. 
 
(b) If equilibrium prices are such that R1 < R2, there is no self-employed individuals in 
equilibrium. Individuals with a skill ratio such that zw w < zmrm choose to become 
employers. Otherwise, they choose to work for a wage. 
 
2. If employers incurred a positive fixed cost of operation (cf > 0), the decision to be an 
employer depends on the skill ratio ( zw ) and on the absolute level of managerial ability 
m 
(zm). Individuals prefer to become employers relative to self-employment when the ability 
    cf   
ratio is such that zw 
m < R2(1 − zmrmw 
). 
 
 
Summarizing, we have developed a theory with three occupational choices and characterize 
occupational decisions.  The theory implies that, in the absence of capital market imperfec- 
tions, the skill ratio zw 
m 
drives occupational choices: Workers have a high zw 
m 
ratio, employers 
a low zw 
m 
ratio, and the self-employed have an intermediate skill ratio. Capital market imper- 
fections distort returns to skill and, thus, occupational choices. A tight borrowing constraint 
depresses the rate of return to the managerial ability of employers and the return to the com- 
posite skill input supplied by self-employed individuals. It also increases the rate of return 
to capital faced by entrepreneurs. As a result, asset holdings matter importantly for occupa- 
tional choice decisions in the presence of financial frictions. These results can be illustrated 
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by drawing the occupational maps in our calibrated model economy. Figure 10 draws the oc- 
cupational map when perfect enforcement is introduced in the calibrated model economy. As 
shown in Proposition 6, when capital markets are perfect occupational choices are determined 
by the zm 
w 
skill ratio. In our baseline economy, with limited enforcement (φ < 1), occupational 
choices are determined by the skill ratio and asset holdings since borrowing constraints affect 
the returns to skills and assets. Figure 11 represents graphically, for two fixed asset levels, 
how occupation varies across individuals that differ on (zm, zw ). In Panel a, the level of assets 
is fixed at the median income and in Panel b it is fixed at the mean income. A comparison 
of the occupational maps, reveal that capital market imperfections expand the region where 
self-employment is optimal at the expense of the regions where employer and worker are the 
preferred occupational choices. 
 
 
5 Quantitative Analysis 
 
 
5.1 Calibration 
 
We partition the parameters in the model economy in two. The first group includes the 
parameters that are set using estimates from other studies in the literature. The second 
group consists of all the parameters that are calibrated by simulating the model economy. 
 
 
Parameters set exogenously The model period is set  to an  year. The international 
interest rate is set at 3%. The utility function is assumed to be of the CES type: 
c1−σ 
u(c) = 
1 − σ 
with σ = 1.5. The parameters of the production function are set to standard values in the 
literature: γ = .2, ν = .3, θ = .5 (see Guner et al. (2008), Buera et al. (2011)). The annual 
depreciation rate is set to at δ = 0.06. 
 
 
Calibrated parameters For ease of exposition, below we list the parameters to be cali- 
brated together with a corresponding target that helps identify each parameter. Nonetheless, 
it is important to keep in mind that the calibration is a multidimensional mapping in which 
all parameters and calibration targets are inter-related. 
 
1. The discount factor β is chosen so that the capital to income ratio in the steady is equal 
to 2.4, which is consistent with the capital to income ratio in Brazil (see Ju´nior et al. 
(2004)). 
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2. Enforcement of credit contracts φ to match a credit to GDP ratio of 43% in Brazil5. 
 
3. The coefficients on the quartic polynomio on age determining how the two working and 
managerial sills vary with age are set so that the age-profile of mean earnings for workers 
and entrepreneurs are roughly consistent with the data. 
 
4. Following Storesletten et al. (2005), the parameters determining the stochastic process on 
working ability such as the variance of fixed effects σ2 2  , persistence of autoregressive 
process ρw , and the variance of the innovation to working ability over the life-cycle σ2 
to match the age profile of the variance of log wages. 
 
5. There are various parameters determining the stochastic process on managerial ability 
(i) the variance of fixed effect on managerial skills σ2 ; (ii) variance of innovations to 
managerial abilities (σ2 ) ; and (iii) the persistence of the auto-regressive process on 
managerial ability (ρm). To pin down these parameters, we target: (i) the proportion 
of entrepreneurs and workers in the population of households (32% versus 68%); (ii) 
the variance of entrepreneurial log-earnings (1.06); and (iii) the persistence of being an 
employer between two consecutive years (68%). 
 
6. The parameter ρ driving the correlation between managerial and working skills is pinned 
down by targeting the ratio of median earnings between entrepreneurs and workers. 
 
7. The fixed cost of operation of employers cf  is set to match the fraction of employers 
among entrepreneurs (one fourth). 
 
 
Discretization of shocks To solve the model numerically, we first find a finite state ap- 
proximation of the following bivariate process describing the life-cycle shocks to skills 
 
ut = Aut−1 + Et, 
 
where ut is a 2 × 1 vector, A is a 2 × 2 matrix, and E is a 2 × 1 vector with mean 0 and 
variance-covariance matrix Σ = E(EEI ). Using that Σ is a symmetric matrix, we can express 
it as follows: 
Σ = QΛQ
I 
, (10) 
 
5We use the average Private Credit/GDP from 2003 until to 2010 from the World Development Indicators 
from the World Bank 
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where Λ is a diagonal matrix (with the eigenvalues of Σ in the diagonal) and Q is the matrix 
of eigenvectors of Σ as columns. The bivariate process can be expresed 
 
� ut−1 + Et, 
 
I Et
 
where  
� 
Et  = QEt. The key to this transformation is that  
� 
I 
has a 
Et ) = Q
I ΣQ = Λ. We then approximate ut  with a 
Et � � 
Markov chain with states given by a matrix U�t  with dimension 2 × 100.  Then the states 
of the Markov chain which approximate ut are given by the matrix U = QU�t  with 
dimension 2 × 100. Because of our life-cycle environment, the variance of shocks grow with 
age. To deal with this feature, we allow the support of the shocks and the Markov chain to 
change with age. The Markov chain is allowed to vary with age so that the finite state  
approximation of the autoregressive bivariate process matches the unconditional variance of 
the continuous bivariate shock process at each age. 
Regarding fixed effects, the bivariate normal distribution is discretized with 3 values for 
working skill and 5 values for managerial skills. As a result, there are 15 pairs of fixed effects. 
At each age, there are 1500 possible pairs of skills (zw , zm). 
 
 
5.2 Calibration results 
 
We now discuss how the calibrated model economy matches the calibration targets. The 
values of the calibrated parameters are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 2 shows that the model economy matches reasonably well the targets for the credit 
to GDP ratio of 43% and the capital to income ratio of 2.4. Figure 5 compares the variance 
of log-earnings of workers in the model economy with the Brazilian data. The model economy 
is consistent with the fact that there is a large amount of inequality early in the life cycle 
and that inequality grows substantially with age over the life cycle. The stochastic process on 
working skills is characterized by a high persistence ( ρw close to 1), which is needed to match 
the linear age-profile of the variance of log wages in the Brazilian data. This is consistent 
with the findings of Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2005) for the US. Relatively to previous 
findings for the US economy, the calibration requires a large variance of individuals fixed 
effects (σαw ) to match the high inequality of wages at age 20 in Brazil. 
The calibration implies that the variances of fixed effects and of the innovation of manage- 
rial skills are much larger than the corresponding variances of working skills (see Table 1). This 
is necessary for the model economy to be consistent with the large variance of entrepreneurial 
earnings in the Brazilian data. 
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Table 3 compares the fraction of households that are workers, self-employed, and employers 
in the calibrated model economy and in Brazil. The model economy matches quite closely 
the fractions of workers (68%), self-employed (24%), and employers (8%) in the data. The 
calibration also matches the fact that about 70% of the employers in Brazil at a given point 
in time are still employers one year after (see Table 3). In the calibrated model economy the 
persistence of entrepreneurial shocks is high (ρm = 0.78 ), but less than the persistence of 
shocks on working ability (ρw = 0.98) 
The calibration implies that the correlation between skills is positive but moderate (ρ = 
0.1). This is necessary for the economy to be consistent with the fact that ratio of median 
income between entrepreneurs and workers is equal to 1 in the Brazilian data. In a sensitivity 
analysis, we later calibrate two economies in which we exogenously set a high and low skill 
correlation. We find  that a  high skill correlation implies a  counterfactually high ratio of 
median income between entrepreneurs and workers. Conversely, a calibration with a negative 
skill correlation implies that the median income of entrepreneurs are below that of workers, 
which is also counterfactual. 
Summing up, we believe that the calibrated model economy provides a reasonable account 
of income inequality and occupational choices in Brazil. 
 
 
5.3 Performance of baseline economy. 
 
We now discuss how the baseline economy matches some facts on occupational transitions 
and on the distribution of income across occupations that were not directly targeted in the 
calibration. 
Table 4 reports predictions of the model economies on occupational transitions between 
the three occupations considered (worker, self-employed, employer). While there are 9 possible 
occupational transitions, we remind the reader that the calibration only targeted the persis- 
tence of being an employer between two consecutive years. The baseline economy matches 
the patterns on the persistence of occupational choices remarkably well (see Table 4). First, 
consistently with the data, the model economies predict that being a worker is quite persis- 
tent: 90% of workers in the model economy are workers one year later. This percentage is 
about 94% in the data. Both in the baseline economy and in the data, entrepreneurs are less 
likely to remain in their occupation than workers.  Second, examining transition rates within 
the entrepreneurial class, the calibrated model economy matches the fact that individuals 
are much more likely to transit into employer from self-employment than from being a paid 
worker. In the data, individuals are about three times more likely to become employers if they 
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are self-employed rather than working for a wage. Indeed, the (annual) transition rate from 
self-employment into employer is 22% while the transition rate from worker to employer is only 
8%. In the model these rates are 26% and 8%, respectively. Third, the (annual) transition 
rates out of employer in the data implies that employers are much more likely to switch to 
self-employment (8%) than to paid work (1%). In the model economy, these transition rates 
are 6% and 1%, respectively. 
The model economy was calibrated to match two statistics on the distribution of income 
across workers and entrepreneurs (ration of median income and the variance of income of 
each of the two occupations). Figure 6 plots the distribution of income across these two 
occupation categories in the data and in the model. The model was calibrated to match the 
fact that the ratio of median income between entrepreneurs and workers is equal to one and 
that the variance of entrepreneurial income is higher than that of workers. Figure 7 plots the 
distribution of income across three occupations (e.g. the entrepreneurial category is subdivides 
in two groups: employers and self-employed). The baseline economy is consistent with the fact 
that there is substantial income heterogeneity in all three occupations. Moreover, as in the 
data, the distribution of self-employment income is shifted to the left relative to that of workers 
and the distribution of worker’s income is shifted to the left relative to that of employers. 
Nonetheless, we emphasize that there is substantial heterogeneity among employers: Some 
low income employers make less income than the median self-employed individual. 
All in all, the model economy matches reasonable well patterns on occupational transitions 
and distribution of income within and across occupations. While we could have built a theory 
with three distinct skills (one for each occupation) to better match the facts, it is remarkable 
that our theory with heterogeneity in two skills provides an excellent account of the patterns 
in the data on the transition rates into and out of the employer occupation. Below, when 
performing a sensitivity analysis, we evaluate other implications of the theory. 
 
 
5.4 Experiment: Removing financial frictions. 
 
In order to assess the effects of credit market institutions, we compute equilibrium in the 
baseline economy under the assumption of perfect credit-enforcement institutions (φ = 1). We 
focus on how capital markets impact on occupational choices, resource allocation, aggregate 
output, and the distribution of income in the economy. 
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5.4.1 Occupational structure and financial frictions. 
 
We find that removing financial frictions has important consequences on the occupational 
structure in the economy. Indeed, the fraction of entrepreneurs decreases from 33% to 18% 
(see Table 5). Moreover, most of the decrease in entrepreneurship is due to a large decrease 
in the rate of self-employment: While self-employment rates drop from 24% to 11%, the 
fraction of employers drops by about 2 percentage points. Altogether, the theory is consistent 
with key stylized facts on changes in the occupational structure with economic development. 
Consistently with the data, the theory that the changes in rates of entrepreneurship across 
rich and poor countries is due to changes in the self-employment rate. The theory is also 
consistent with the fact that the fraction of workers in the labor force tends to increase with 
economic development: It increases from 68% in the baseline economy to 82% with perfect 
capital markets. 
The mechanism through which capital markets impact on the occupational structure is 
through its impact on equilibrium wages. When financial frictions are removed, the wage 
rate increases due to a better allocation of productive resources (employers are better selected 
and they can use more capital). The increase in the wage rate strongly discourages self- 
employment, as can be seen by comparing the self-employment region (green region) in the 
occupational maps drawn in Figure 10 and Figure 11. Note that capital market imperfections 
expand the region where self-employment is optimal at the expense of the regions where 
employer and worker are the preferred occupational choices. 
 
 
5.4.2 Output, resource allocation, and financial frictions. 
 
The gain in aggregate output of eliminating financial frictions is quite large: It amounts to an 
increase of 48% (see Table 6). There is also a substantial change in the sectorial composition 
of output. While production by employers increase by 64%, production by self-employed 
decreases by 53%. This should not be surprising given that the removal of financial frictions 
leads to large reduction in the rates of self-employment in the baseline economy. 
We now consider the impact of financial frictions on the efficiency of production. To 
this end, we compute (TFP) as the (input-weighted) average productivity with which the 
composite capital and labor input is used in production across entrepreneurs r 
kν  θ  
T F P = γ i ni i r ν  θ 
 
di, 
i∈E i∈E ki n di 
where mi = (zmiti)γ  is the managerial input used by entrepreneur i and similarly for ni and 
ki. We find that aggregate TFP increases by 24% when financial frictions are removed. TFP 
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increased by 9% and 16% among self-employed and employers, respectively. Note that the 
aggregate TFP gain (24%) is higher than the gain in each of the two sectors (9% and 16%). 
The reason is that the removal of financial frictions leads to a reallocation of capital from self- 
employed to employers: The share of aggregate capital used by the self-employed drops from 
19% to 4%. Because employers tend to have a higher managerial ability than self-employed 
entrepreneurs, the reallocation of capital between these two groups enhances the aggregate 
productivity gains of removing financial frictions. 
Having said that self-employed are less productive entrepreneurs than employers, it is im- 
portant to recognize that self-employment reduces the impact of financial frictions on output. 
To assess how self-employment affects the impact of financial frictions on aggregate output, 
we shut down self-employment in the baseline economy and simulate the removal of finan- 
cial frictions. We find that the output gain is 53%, which is higher than the 48% increase 
obtained when simulating the removal of financial frictions in the baseline economy. Hence, 
self-employment decreases the negative impact of financial frictions on aggregate output. This 
finding can be explained as follows: Financial frictions make it hard for young and talented 
entrepreneurs (individuals with high managerial skills) to raise external funds. This effect is 
compounded by the fact that financial frictions depress the equilibrium real wage, which makes 
it difficult to accumulate savings by working for a paid wage when young. Self-employment 
allows talented entrepreneurs to circumvent the low wage and build up savings, diminishing 
the negative impact of financial frictions on aggregate output. 
It is also interesting to decompose the gains in TFP due to the removal of financial frictions 
between the ones that are due to a better allocation of capital and labor inputs across en- 
trepreneurs (intensive margin) versus the gains coming from a better selection of entrepreneurs 
(extensive margin). To this end, we re-distribute the capital in the baseline economy in order 
to equate the marginal product of capital across all entrepreneurs.6 We find that capital real- 
location leads to a TFP gain of 1.3% for the self-employed and of 12% for employers (see Table 
7). Hence, reallocation of capital accounts for 14% of the gains in among the self-employed 
and for 76% of the gains among employers. At the aggregate level, reallocation accounts for 
about half of the TFP gains (54%). 
The result that the intensive margin accounts for a much larger fraction of the TFP gains 
 
6While the marginal product of the labor input is equated across employers, this equality does not hold 
across self-employed individuals because we assume that labor input is not movable across the self-employed. 
Alternatively, we could have allowed self-employed to pay a fixed cost in order to equate the marginal product 
of labor. However, this would effectively imply an occupational switch (from self-employer to employer) which 
we consider as part of the extensive margin. 
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of employers than of the self-employed, suggests that borrowing constraints are tight among 
the former but not among the latter. Figure 8 plots the histogram of the ratio of the marginal 
product of capital relative to the gross interest rate (r + δ) across employers and self-employed 
individuals. Note that this ratio is equal to one for about 85% of self-employed, indicating that 
the vast majority of the self-employed are not borrowing constraint. The reason is that self- 
employed individuals tend to operate their businesses at a much smaller scale than employers 
(their mean managerial input is about one-twentieth the one of employers) and do not need to 
borrow much capital. On the other hand,the marginal product of capital varies substantially 
across employers and the vast majority of them face a binding borrowing constraint. 
 
 
5.4.3 Impact of financial frictions on the distribution of income. 
 
Financial frictions affect the distribution of income in many ways. While the overall effect on 
income inequality is not large7, it has important effects on the sources of income inequality 
and on its persistence over time. 
We start by analyzing how financial frictions affect the distribution of capital versus non- 
labor income. Capital income is computed as ra + µk. Non-capital income is computed as the 
sum of labor income, managerial rents, and self-employment rents. Abusing terminology from 
now on we refer to non-capital income as labor income. Table 14 compares the Gini indexes of 
capital and labor income across economies. We find that capital income is much more unevenly 
distributed than labor income both in the baseline economy and in the perfect capital market 
economies. Surprisingly, we find that capital market imperfections have opposing effects on 
the concentration of labor and capital income. Labor income is more evenly distributed in 
the baseline economy than in the economy with perfect enforcement, with a Gini index of .52 
in the former economy and of 56 in the latter economy). On the other hand, the Gini index 
of capital income is about 10 percentage points higher in the baseline economy. The opposite 
effects of capital market imperfections on the distributions of capital income and labor income 
offset each other and account for the small change in the Gini index of income. 
The fact that the distribution of factor income varies so much across economies is symp- 
tomatic of the resource misallocation prevalent under imperfect capital markets. The low 
concentration of the distribution of labor income in the baseline economy is due to the fact 
that borrowing constraints distorts rate of returns to managerial ability (recall that µ > 0 re- 
duces rm). Moreover, in the baseline economy returns to managerial ability rm and managerial 
ability zm  are strongly negative correlated, with a correlation coefficient of −0.5. Thus, skill- 
 
7The Gini index of income decreases from 0.53 to 0.52 with the removal of financial frictions 
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ful managers tend to receive low returns to their ability. On the other hand, the correlation 
coefficient between these two variables is zero in the economy with perfect capital markets, as 
there is no heterogeneity in rate of returns to ability. 
Capital income is highly unequal in the baseline economy because there is substantial 
heterogeneity in the returns to capital. The interest rate on deposits (3%) is substantially 
smaller than the average marginal product on capital obtained by employers (13.2% net of 
depreciation). Moreover, the marginal product of capital across employers varies importantly 
and its distribution features a coefficient of variation above .60. Again, this fact is symptomatic 
of resource being inefficiently allocated. 
The presence of borrowing constraints imply that the returns to managerial ability are 
positively correlated with capital income. Hence, the correlation between capital and labor 
income is equal to .80 in the baseline economy, which is much larger than the .50 value in the 
economy with perfect capital markets. In the latter, the positive correlation between capital 
and labor income is due to the fact that highly able people tend to hold more capital than 
low ability people but not to rate of return differentials. 
 
 
5.4.4 Capital markets and the persistence of income. 
 
To evaluate the effect of imperfect capital markets on the persistence of income, we simulate 
data in the baseline economy and in the economy with perfect capital markets and run the 
following regression in 
 
log(yt,j ) = αj + βlog(yt  1,j ) + b age + b age2, (11) 
 
 
where ytj represents the income of individual j at age t, αj is an individual fixed effect, 
and β measures the persistence of log-income. We find that removing financial frictions in 
the baseline economy reduces the estimated value of β from 0.81 to 0.74. Income is more 
persistent in the baseline economy because assets are positively correlated with rate of returns 
and because assets matter for occupational choices. On the other hand, when there is perfect 
enforcement assets do not affect rates of returns and occupational choices and the persistence 
of income is only driven by the persistence of shocks and asset holdings. 
 
 
5.4.5 Capital markets and the distribution of consumption. 
 
Financial frictions have an heterogeneous impact across households. To assess the distributive 
impact of financial frictions, Table 15 compares consumption inequality in the baseline model 
economies with that in an economy with perfect enforcement of credit contracts φ = 1. We find 
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that financial frictions have important effects on the distribution of consumption. We find that 
the Gini coefficient of consumption is 2 percentage points lower in the economy with perfect 
enforcement of credit contracts (φ = 1). It is interesting that financial frictions have opposite 
effects on the inequality at the top and the bottom of the consumption distribution. The 
ratio of consumption between the 10th percentile and the 50th percentile of the consumption 
distribution is equal to 0.29 in the baseline model economy. This ratio increases to 0.33 in 
the economy with φ = 1. On the other hand, the consumption ratio between households at 
the 90th and 50th percentile increases from 3.3 to 3.44. Hence, relative to the perfect credit 
economy, the baseline model economy has more inequality at the bottom of the consumption 
distribution but less inequality at the top. The first effect is more important than the latter 
effect so that overall consumption inequality, as measured by the Gini index, is higher in the 
baseline economy than in the φ = 1 economy. 
 
 
5.5 Is the skill distribution important for the aggregate effects of 
financial frictions? 
To show that the skill distribution matters importantly for the impact of financial frictions 
we consider two new economies in which we fixed exogenously the skill correlation. In one 
economy, the skill correlation is fixed to a high positive value (ρ = 0.8 and in the other to 
a high negative value (ρ = −0.8). The two economies are re-calibrated to the same targets 
of the baseline economy, except for the fact that we do not target the ratio of median earn- 
ings between entrepreneurs and workers. We then compare across economies the impact of 
removing financial frictions. 
 
 
5.5.1 The impact of financial frictions across economies. 
 
The output gains of removing financial frictions vary substantially across the three calibrated 
model economies (see Table 10).8 The output gains range from 36% to 55% as the correlation 
between skills decreases from 0.8 to -0.8. Similarly, the TFP gains across these economies 
range from 22% to 31%. Hence, financial frictions have much lower effects on output per 
worker and TFP when skills are (strongly) positively correlated. The correlation between 
skills matters for the impact of financial frictions because it shapes the correlation between 
savings and managerial talent in equilibrium.  In particular, the financing problems faced by 
8The match of the calibrated targets is better in the baseline economy.  The calibrated parameters and 
calibration results for the economies with very positive or very negative correlation are available upon request. 
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talented entrepreneurs are less severe when entrepreneurs are also talented workers. When 
individuals are highly skillful both at managing and at working, they can work for a wage 
and build savings in order to diminish the negative effects of borrowing constraints on their 
entrepreneurial income. On the other hand, talented entrepreneurs find it more difficult 
to accumulate savings when skills are negatively correlated, making borrowing constraints 
tighter. Moreover, talented entrepreneurs have a harder time building up savings relative to 
other individuals with lower entrepreneurial talent because the latter have higher working 
skills. By allowing individuals with low managerial talent to build savings faster, financial 
frictions provide low skilled managers with a comparative advantage at entrepreneurship. 
These effects explain why the skill correlation matters importantly for the output and TFP 
losses caused by financial frictions. 
A key innovation of our theory is that it allows entrepreneurs to choose what fraction of 
their time they allocate to managing versus working. This assumption allows our theory to be 
consistent with the fact that self-employment is quite important in poor countries. We now 
show that self-employment matters for the quantitative impact of financial frictions in the three 
calibrated model economies. To this end, we shut down self-employment in all economies and 
simulate the impact of financial frictions. We find that in all the calibrated model economies 
the output gains due to the elimination of financial frictions increase substantially in the 
absence of self-employment (by between 6 to 8 percentage points). Since wages are low with 
financial frictions, self-employment allows individuals with high managerial skill to attain 
higher earnings. This effect is most important in the economy with negative correlation of 
skills since in this economy individuals with high managerial ability tend to have lower working 
ability. 
To further understand how the skill correlation matters for the impact of financial frictions, 
we analyze how financial frictions distort the rate of returns to the various production inputs. 
Recall that when capital market are perfect the rate of return of all productive inputs are 
equalized across production units. However, rates of return do vary across production units 
under financial frictions (see Section 4). We now show that the skill correlation parameter ρ 
matters importantly for the variation in rate of returns caused by financial frictions. Table 12 
compares the variation in rates of returns among employers and self-employed individuals in 
the calibrated model economies.  The standard deviation of the marginal product of capital 
among employers is twice as large in the economy with ρ = −0.8 than in the economy with 
ρ = 0.8 (.14 versus .07). The variation in rates of returns to capital reflects the variation in the 
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tightness of the borrowing constraint across entrepreneurs.9 The results in Table 12 show that 
when skills are positively correlated there is less heterogeneity in rates of return on capital 
across entrepreneurs than when skills are negatively correlated. Intuitively, the financing 
problems faced by talented entrepreneurs are less severe when entrepreneurs are also talented 
workers. This is because households with high working skills can rapidly accumulate savings 
and alleviate the financial constraints that limit the operation of their businesses.  On the 
other hand, when skills are negatively correlated borrowing constraints are tighter because 
talented entrepreneurs find it more difficult to accumulate savings. 
Borrowing constraints also generate heterogeneity on the rate of return to the managerial 
input among employers (rm) and on the rate of return on the self-employment composite(rmw ). 
Both of these returns decrease with the tightness of financial constraints (see Section 4). Table 
12 shows that the variation in rates of return to the managerial input among employers is 
about twice as large in the economy with ρ = −0.8 than in the economy with ρ = 0.8 (0.31 
versus 0.17.) Moreover, while in all economies the return to the managerial skill is negatively 
correlated with the level of managerial ability, this correlation is the lowest in the economy with 
ρ = −0.8 (about −0.63). When skills are strongly negatively correlated, the tight borrowing 
constraints faced by entrepreneurs with high managerial skills imply that they obtain a lower 
return to their skills than less able entrepreneurs. In this case financial frictions generate 
a strong comparative advantage at entrepreneurship for households with lower managerial 
talent but higher working ability, reducing the average entrepreneurial ability, and total factor 
productivity. Table 9 shows that changes in TFP associated with the elimination of financial 
frictions range from 31% to 22%, with the largest (lowest) increase attained in the economy 
with strongly negative (positive) correlation of skills. 
 
 
5.5.2 Comparing economies with different correlation of skills 
 
We have shown that the impact of financial frictions vary substantially across the three cal- 
ibrated model economies. Then, in order to assess the impact of financial frictions in the 
Brazilian economy it is important to use Brazilian data to test the predictions of the cali- 
brated model economies. 
Skill correlation and distribution of income across occupations. Figure 12 shows 
that the calibrated model economies differ importantly in the distribution of income by occu- 
pation (workers versus entrepreneurs). The economy with strongly correlated shocks ρ = 0.80 
9Recall that the marginal product of capital can be expressed as M P K = r + δ + µ, where µ represents 
the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint (see Section 4). 
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is grossly at odd with the brazilian data: It counterfactually predicts that the distribution 
of earnings of workers is shifted to the left relative to that of entrepreneurs. The economy 
with strongly negative correlated shocks ρ = −0.80 is also at odds with the brazilian data 
since it implies that the distribution of earnings of workers is shifted to the right relative to 
that of entrepreneurs. On the other hand, our baseline economy (with ρ = 0.10) fits the 
brazilian evidence on the income distribution across occupations reasonably well. Indeed, the 
baseline economy was calibrated to match the ratio of median income between workers and 
entrepreneurs (which is 1.0 both in Brazil and in the baseline model economy). This statistic 
takes a value of 0.7 in the economy with ρ = 0.8 and a value of 1.3 when ρ = −0.8. 
Figure 13 compares the distribution of income in the calibrated model economies and 
Brazil when the population is divided in three occupational groups (workers, self-employed, 
and employers). The economy with strongly correlated shocks counterfactually predicts that 
the earnings distribution of self-employed individuals is shifted to the right relative to that 
of workers. As ρ decreases, the distribution of earnings of self-employed individuals shifts to 
the left. As a result, consistently with the evidence, the economies with ρ = 0.10 and −0.80 
exhibit a distribution of earnings of self-employed households that is shifted to the left relative 
to that of workers. Overall, the economy with ρ = .10 is the one that fits the evidence best. 
Relative to the data, the economy with a strong negative skill correlation implies that the 
self-employed individuals have too low earnings relative to workers. 
We now discuss why the correlation between skills matters importantly for the income dis- 
tribution across occupations. When ρ is sufficiently high, the correlation between ln(zmt/zwt) 
and ln(zwt) becomes positive. In this case, a high skill ratio zmt/zwt is also associated with 
high values of zmt and zwt so that households that have a comparative advantage at managing 
(high zmt/zwt) also have an absolute advantage in both skills. When entrepreneurs have an 
absolute advantage in both occupations, highly skilled workers tend to have a comparative 
advantage at managing and choose the entrepreneurial occupation. Low skill workers do not 
have a comparative advantage at managing and choose to work for a wage. As a result, the 
earnings distribution among entrepreneurs is shifted to the right relative to the earnings dis- 
tribution among workers and earnings inequality between occupations is large. On the other 
hand, when the correlation between ln(zmt/zwt) and ln(zwt) is negative households in one oc- 
cupation tend to be better at that occupation than households choosing the other occupation. 
Earnings inequality across occupations is not as large as in the absolute advantage case. 
It is easy to show that the skill ratio and the working skill are jointly log-normally dis- 
31  
σ + σ w
t 
w
t 
σ 
w
t 
w
t 
2 
tributed for each age t: 
/ 
ln(zmt/zwt) 
\
 
 
 
/1 
0 
l 1 
2
 
N , mt 
 
 
2  − 2ρwmtσwtσmt ρwmtσwtσmt − σ2 
l\
 
ln(zwt) 
∼
 0 ρwmtσwtσmt − σ2 2 
The absolute advantage case arises when the correlation between ln(zmt/zwt) and ln(zwt) 
is positive, which holds if and only if 
ρ > 
σwt 
wmt  σ mt 
Thus, the correlation of skills have to be sufficiently strong for the absolute advantage case to 
hold. Figure 9 graphs the correlation between ln(zmt/zwt) and ln(zwt) for the three calibrated 
model economies. The economy with ρ = 0.80 is the only one with a positive correlation. In 
this economy, households with high managerial ability tend to have an absolute advantage 
in skills (have higher managerial and working skills). The economy with ρ = 0.10 exhibits a 
correlation between ln(zmt/zwt) and ln(zwt) of roughly −0.30. 
Skill correlation and the persistence  of  earnings.  The correlation between skills 
also matter for the persistence of earnings over time. Intuitively, earnings are less volatile 
when skills are positively correlated than negatively correlated. To compare the persistence of 
earnings across the calibrated model economies, for each economy we simulate artificial data 
and run the regression in (11). We find that the persistent of log-income increases from 0.73 to 
0.84 as ρ increases from −0.8 to 0.8. Unfortunately, we do not have panel data from Brazil to 
estimate the persistence of income in Brazil. Nonetheless, we can use consumption data from 
Brazilian households to test the predictions of the theory. The idea is that consumption theory 
implies that permanent income is a key determinant  of  consumption  decisions.  Hence,  the 
higher the persistence of income the higher should be the cross-sectional correlation between 
consumption and income across households (e.g. the correlation between consumption  and 
income  at  a  given  date  t).   Table  13  shows  that  the  correlation  between  consumption  and 
income varies widely across the calibrated model economies: from 0.24 when ρ = −0.8, to .79 
when ρ = 0.1, and up to 0.85 when ρ = 0.8. This correlation is 0.71 in the Brazilian data. 
Skill correlation and selection of entrepreneurs. The skill correlation matters im- 
portantly for how entrepreneurs are selected from the wage distribution. This is shown by 
comparing wages at a given point in time between those who become entrepreneurs in the 
following period relative to those who did not. In particular, this is done by running the 
following regression on log wages: 
 
log(yt−1) = b0 + b1 ∗ age + b2age + b3 ∗ entrepreneurt, 
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z 
where yt−1 denotes wage income in period t − 1 and entrepreneurt is a dummy that takes 
value of 1 if the individual becomes an entrepreneur in period t. This regression is run for the 
three calibrated model economies as well as for the Brazilian data.10 
We find that in the Brazilian data, entrepreneurs are drawn negatively from the wage 
distribution (the coefficient b3  is negative and equal to -0.13).  The baseline economy also 
implies a negative coefficient with a value of −0.36 (see Table 11). The economy with ρ = 0.8 
a positive value of b3. The economy with strongly negative correlated skills implies a too low 
value for b3 (-0.86). 
To investigate whether self-employed are differently selected from the wage distribution 
relative to employers, we run the wage regression above but allowing for a dummy for self- 
employment. We then consider another specification in which we allow for a dummy to indicate 
those workers who switch into employer. We find that in the Brazilian data self-employed tend 
to be negatively selected from the wage distribution (b3 = −0.24) but that employers tend to 
be positively selected (b3 = 0.43). The baseline economy (ρ = 0.1) is consistent with these 
patters (the dummy for self-employment is -0.43 and the one for employers is 0.50). 
Altogether, the Brazilian evidence reviewed supports the economy with a moderately pos- 
itive correlation between managerial and working skills (ρ = 0.1). 
 
 
5.6 The political economy of financial frictions 
 
While it is well understood that financial frictions can have a large negative impact on ag- 
gregate output and total factor productivity, it is less clear why the institutions leading to 
poor property rights and contract enforcement are so persistent. In this section we use our 
theory to gain some insights into the political economy of financial frictions. In our theory, 
financial frictions have an heterogeneous impact across individuals that differ on age, wealth, 
and skills. Since our model economy was calibrated to Brazilian household data, we use 
our theory to assess the distribution of welfare gains of eliminating financial frictions in the 
Brazilian economy. 
We assume that the baseline economy (ρ = 0.10) is in steady state and that suddenly 
and unexpectedly there is a once and for all institutional reform that increases φ to 1. On 
impact, the wealth distribution does not matter for occupational choice decisions. Now, the 
skill ratio zm 
w 
is the only determinant of occupational choice decisions. Workers who could not 
operate as entrepreneurs because of binding borrowing constraints can now start a business. 
 
10While the Brazilian data is not a panel, we have data on the occupational choices of individuals one year 
apart. 
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Moreover, entrepreneurs who were initially borrowing constraint see their managerial rents 
(rmzm) and entrepreneurial income increase (see the discussion in Section 4). The importance 
of this effect varies across individuals: It is more important for talented entrepreneurs (high 
zm) because, ceteris paribus, they were more likely to be initially constrained. As talented 
entrepreneurs raise their demand of capital relative to less talented entrepreneurs, capital 
is reallocated towards more productive entrepreneurs, increasing the demand for labor, and 
the equilibrium wage rate. The rise in wages decrease the profits of entrepreneurs. Hence, 
employers’ income can go up or down depending on whether the increase in managerial rents 
is higher or lower than the increase in labor costs. 
The financial reform has non-trivial effects on the distribution of income. Occupational 
choices of individuals are crucial for understanding how the reform impacts on them. Keeping 
fixed the occupational choices of the initial steady state, workers gain with the reform since 
the wage rate increase. Self-employed also gain since they can borrow more. Unconstrained 
employers loose since wage payments go up but their managerial rents do not increase. Con- 
strained employers may gain or loose depending on whether the increase in managerial rents 
outweighs the increase in wages. Since the increase in managerial rents is likely to be more 
important for talented entrepreneurs, these entrepreneurs are more likely to see their income 
increase. The untalented entrepreneurs who were operating businesses prior to the reform are 
likely to see their income go down and to switch occupations. 
We now explain how we compute the distribution of welfare gains from the reform. The 
small open economy assumption simplifies the computation significantly. Once the reform 
takes place, the marginal product of capital will be equated across entrepreneurs and will 
be equal to the international interest rate plus the depreciation rate of capital. On impact, 
competition for workers will drive the wage rate to its new long run value, which increases 
on impact by about 40%. While the distribution of wealth, consumption, and income may 
change for some periods after the reform, all macroeconomic aggregates (capital, GDP, wage 
rate) will be constant after the initial period of the reform. Since there are no transitional 
dynamics in the macroeconomic aggregates, we can then compute the distribution of welfare 
gains for all individuals alive at the moment of the reform as follows: 
 
1. Simulate the distribution of households across states s = (age, assets, zm, zw ) from the 
initial steady state prior to the reform. 
 
2. For each household in state s, compute the permanent consumption compensation in the 
original steady state that will let the household attain the same utility as in the perfect 
credit economy.  Denoting by V baseline(s) the discounted lifetime utility of a household 
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in the baseline economy, and V φ=1(s) the value function in the perfect enforcement 
economy, the consumption compensation λ(s) is computed as follows: 
 
 
λ(s) = 
( 
V φ=1(s) 
V baseline(s) 
 
   1   \ 
1−σc 
 
− 1, 
 
where σc denotes the curvature of the period utility function in consumption ( σc = 
1.5). Households with λ(s) > 0 gain from the elimination of enforcement problems. 
Households with λ(s) < 0 see their welfare decrease with the reform of financial market 
institutions. 
 
We find that the average welfare gain among households alive at the period of the institu- 
tional reform is 16.5%. The standard deviation of the distribution of welfare gains is 13.5%. 
Figure 14 shows the distribution of welfare gains across the population and documents that 
there is substantial heterogeneity. While the vast majority of households gain from the re- 
form, about 8.7% of the population see their welfare decrease with the reform. Who are the 
households that lose with the reform? 
Figure 15, 16, 17, 18, show the age, asset, and managerial-skill distributions among those 
who oppose and support the reform. We find that households that lose from the reform tend to 
be older, richer, and exhibit higher managerial skills and lower working skills than households 
that support the reform. These findings are just reflecting that occupational choices are crucial 
for understanding the political economy of the reform: Among the households that are worse 
off with the reform, about 93% of them would have been entrepreneurs on the period of the 
reform had the reform not taken place, and 66% would have been employers. 
Employers are a positive selection from the population distribution of managerial skills. 
Then , the fact that about two thirds of those who oppose the reform are employers explains 
why the managerial ability of those supporting the reform is higher than that of those opposing 
the reform. Nonetheless, not all employers support the reform:  About 36% of employers in 
the initial equilibrium benefit from the elimination of enforcement problems. We find that 
the employers benefiting from the reform tend to be of higher managerial ability than those 
who oppose it. The reason is that high ability employers are more likely to be borrowing 
constrained than low ability entrepreneurs. As a result, they are more likely to operate at an 
inefficient scale and to gain more from the elimination of enforcement problems. On the other 
hand, the financial reform hurts many of the lower skill employers and force them to change 
their occupation status: About 46% of the entrepreneurs that oppose to the reform and would 
have been employers had the reform not taken place, do not hire any labor after the reform 
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(most of them become self-employed after the reform). The wage hike after the reform makes 
it unprofitable for these entrepreneurs to hire outside labor. 
Summing up, while most households benefits from a reform that eliminates enforcement 
problems, the majority of employers (about two thirds) lose from the reform. By depressing 
the demand for labor, limited enforcement depresses the equilibrium wage rate, increasing the 
profits of employers. Obviously, entrepreneurs as a group will benefit even more by forming 
a cartel in order to restrict labor demand and depress the wage rate. This achieves the goal 
of depressing the wage rate but without distorting the capital markets. However, this cartel 
agreement is not incentive compatible as each entrepreneur will have incentives to violate the 
group agreement and hire labor. Importantly, limited enforcement is an incentive feasible 
mechanism that leads to a depress wage rate. Our theory thus suggests that employers may 
have a vested interested in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
We develop a theory of entrepreneurship, financial frictions, and economic inequality in Brazil. 
The key innovation of our theory is to extend the Lucas (1978) model in order to incorpo- 
rate heterogeneity in two skills: − working and managerial skills. This modeling feature is 
necessary for the theory to be consistent with evidence on the income distribution across oc- 
cupations in Brazil. Moreover, the theory has the novel implication that some entrepreneurs 
will not hire any outside labor and be own account workers (or self-employed entrepreneurs), 
which is consistent with the cross-country evidence that the high rates of entrepreneurship 
in poor countries, such as in Brazil, is mostly due to the prevalence of self-employed work- 
ers. We show that financial frictions have a non-trivial impact on inequality: On the one 
hand, they lead to higher and persistent inequality by generating variation in returns to skills 
and by making these returns depend on asset holdings. On the other hand, since borrowing 
constraints tend to be tighter for highly skill than for low skill individuals, financial frictions 
reduce inequality by diminishing the rents obtained by highly skilled individuals relative to a 
situation with perfect capital markets. 
The model economy is used to simulate the effects of removing financial frictions in Brazil. 
We find that the changes on the occupational structure are large: The fraction of entrepreneurs 
decreases from 33% to 18%, with the bulk of the decrease in entrepreneurship explained by 
the large decrease in the rate of self-employment. The gains in aggregate output of removing 
financial frictions amounts to 48%, with asymmetric effects in the sectorial composition of 
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output: While production of employers increase by 64%, production of the self-employed 
decreases by 53%. We also simulate the impact of removing financial frictions when self- 
employment is shut down in the baseline economy. We find that the output gain is 53%, which 
is higher than the 48% increase obtained in the baseline economy. Hence, self-employment 
decreases the negative impact of financial frictions on aggregate output. We find that capital 
market imperfections have opposing effects on the concentration of labor income and capital 
income. Labor income is more evenly distributed in the economy with imperfect capital 
markets than in the economy with no financial frictions (with a Gini index of .52 versus a 
Gini index .56 in the latter economy). This is because financial frictions depress the rents 
earn by highly able entrepreneurs relative to an economy with perfect capital markets. On 
the other hand, the Gini index of capital income is about 10 percentage points higher in the 
economy with imperfect credit markets. 
We evaluate the distribution of welfare gains and losses of eliminating financial frictions. 
While the vast majority of households gain from a reform that eliminates capital market imper- 
fections, about 8.7% of the population see their welfare decrease with the reform. Households 
that lose from the reform tend to be older, richer, and exhibit higher managerial skills and 
lower working skills than households that support the reform. These findings are just re- 
flecting that occupational choices are crucial for understanding the political economy of the 
reform: Among the households that are worse off with the reform, about 93% of them would 
have been entrepreneurs on the period of the reform had the reform not taken place, and 66% 
would have been employers. Our theory thus suggests that employers in Brazil may have a 
vested interested in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement. 
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameters 
 
ρw,m = 0.1 
ρw 0.98 
ρm 0.78 
α,w 0.38 
α,m 1.59 
w 0.03 
m 0.99 
cf 0.10 
φ 0.23 
β 0.995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Calibration Results-Model Aggregates 
 
 Data Model 
K/Y 2.4 2.3 
Credit/GDP 43% 42% 
Var  Log(Earn)-Entrepreneurs 1.1 1.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Calibration Results-Occupational Structure 
 
Fraction Data Model 
Workers 68% 67% 
Self-Employed 24% 24% 
Employers 8% 9% 
Emp to Emp 70% 68% 
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Table 4: Performance of the Model-Transitions 
 
Transitions Data Model 
W to W 94% 90% 
SE to W 5% 9% 
E to W 1% 1% 
W to SE 14% 28% 
SE to SE 78% 64% 
E to SE 8% 8% 
W to E 8% 6% 
SE to E 22% 26% 
E to E 70% 68% 
In the table above we use W for Workers, SE for Self-Employed and E for Employers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Occupational Structure and Financial Frictions 
 
Occupation Baseline Economy No Frictions 
Workers 67% 82% 
Self-Employed 24% 11% 
Employers 9% 7% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Aggregate Effects of Removing Financial Frictions 
 
Changes in % Output TFP 
Aggregate 48 24 
Self-Employed -53 9 
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Employers 64 16 
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Table 7: TFP and Financial Frictions 
 
Changes in % TFP T F PReallocation 
Aggregate 24 13 (54%) 
Self-Employed 9 1.3 (14%) 
Employers 16 12 (76%) 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Income Inequality and Financial Frictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 φ = 0.23 φ = 1 
Gini Labor Income 0.52 0.56 
Gini Capital Income 0.67 0.59 
Corr (cap inc., lab inc.) 0.80 0.50 
Persistence of inc. 0.81 0.74 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Changes in Output-From benchmark to φ = 1 
 
ρ = 0.1 
Output Change (%)- Baseline 48 
Output Change (%)- No Labor Heterogeneity 48 
Output Change (%)- No Self-Employed 54 
Table 10: Changes in Output-From Benchmark to φ = 1 
 
  ρ  
-0.8 0.1 0.8 
Output Change (%)- Baseline 55 48 37 
Output Change (%)- No Labor Heterogeneity 47 48 41 
Output Change (%)- No Self-Employed 63 54 44 
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Table 11: Skill Correlation ρ and the Selection of Entrepreneurs 
 
  ρ  
-0.8 0.1 0.8 
Output Change (%)- Baseline 55 48 37 
Output Change (%)- No Labor Heterogeneity 47 48 41 
Output Change (%)- No Self-Employed 63 54 44 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Statistics on returns for different occupations and TFP gains 
 
 ρw,m = 0.1 
TFP gains (%) 15 
Employers  
Std. Dev. M P Ke 0.10 
Std. Dev. ce 0.19 
corr(ce, zm) 
Self-Employed 
-0.55 
Std. Dev. M P Kse 0.06 
Std. Dev. cse 0.07 
corr(cse, zm) -0.30 
For φ = 1 the standard deviation is 0 for all variables 
 
ce  is the return to managerial input for employers 
 
cse  is the return to the composite input for self-employed 
 
M P Ke, M P Kse are the marginal product of capital for employers and self-employed respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Implications of ρ for earnings and consumption 
 
 Data Model 
Ratio Median Earnings Worker to Entrepreneur 1.0 1.0 
corr(earningst, earningst−1) N.A. 0.81 
corr(earningst, consumptiont) 0.71 0.79 
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Table 14: Gini Inex-Labor and Capital Income 
 
 
 
Gini Index 
 
 φ = 0.23 φ = 1 
Labor Income 0.52 0.56 
Capital Income 0.67 0.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15:  Consumption Inequality and Financial Frictions 
 
 φ = 0.23 φ = 1 
Gini 0.50 0.48 
p90/p10 11.5 10.33 
p90/p50 3.29 3.44 
p10/p50 0.29 0.33 
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Figure 3:  Distribution of Earnings in Brazil by Occupation-I 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Elaboration based on PME 2003-2010 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Earnings in Brazil by Occupation-II 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Elaboration based on PME 2003-2010 
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Figure 7: Distribution of Earnings-Data vs Model II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: MPK and Market Return on Capital 
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Figure 9: Correlation between zm 
w 
and zw for different ρw,m 
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Figure 10: Occupational Map-φ = 1 
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Figure 11: Occupational Maps Benchmark Economy 
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Figure 14: Welfare Gains from Financial Reform 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Age Distribution of Winners and Losers from the Reform 
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Figure 16:  Wealth Distribution and the Reform 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17:  Distribution of Managerial Ability and the Reform 
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Figure 18: Distribution of Managerial Ability and the Reform among Employers 
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7 Appendix A 
 
 
Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego From this survey we have data for the years 2003 until 
2010. The PME is a monthly household survey covering the metropolitan areas of six Brazil- 
ian regions: Rio de Janeiro, Sa˜o Paulo, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Recife and Salvador. 
Each individual is followed for three months, left out of the sample the next eight months 
and interviewed again the following 4 months. We take the first and fifth interview of each 
individual for the years 2003 until 2010. In this way we keep two observation of each indi- 
vidual, which corresponds to the same month of consecutive years. We keep only household 
where the head is male and he is older than twenty and younger than sixty years old. The 
earnings of the household are the sum of the earnings of all members. In order to make the 
earnings comparable we deflect them with the corresponding month Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) and we divide them by the number of adults equivalents in the house. In addition, 
we only keep individuals who are employed in both periods of the survey. In the final data 
set we have 131,056 households with data for earnings. Individual households age is defined 
as the age of the household head. We use 5 years bin, centered at the age of interested, in 
order to compute statistics by age. To do the transition matrix of employment we consider 
the individual data. The variable of earnings that we consider is a constructed variable, which 
includes the earnings effectively perceived by the individual in the month from all the works 
done. 
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Pesquisa de Ornamentos Familiares The POF is a Consumption-Income survey done 
every five or six years. We use data from the last wave, 2008-2009. We consider households 
where the main earner is a male, older than twenty and younger than sixty years old. We 
end up with 44,930 observations. Our income variable includes: income from work, Transfers, 
Income from rents, other and Asset Variation. Our measure of consumption includes: food, 
housing, clothing, transport, health and personal care, education, recreation and culture, 
smoking, personal services and other current expenses. We normalize household income and 
consumption by dividing them by the number of adults equivalents in the house. 
 
 
8 Appendix B 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. Capital rental k by an entrepreneur with wealth a and skills 
(zm, zw ) is enforceable if and only if 
 
max 
m,n,nd,te 
{mγ kν nθ − wnd − r(k − a) + a − δk − cf In >0} ≥ 
 
 
 
which is equivalent to 
max 
m,n,nd,tm 
{mγ kν nθ − wnd + (1 − δ)k − cf In >0} 
 
(1 + r)a ≥ φ 
( 
1 −φ + r + δ + δφ 
k φ  max m kν nθ 
φ  m,n,nd,te 
 
— wnd 
1 
— cf Ind>0} 
 
Following arguments in Buera et al. (2011), the set of enforceable levels of capital rentals is 
characterized by a simple set of rental limits. Two cases are relevant. If the max in the RHS 
is attained with nd = 0, the set of enforceable levels of capital is [0, k(a, zm, zw ; φ)] where 
k(a, zm, zw ; φ), where k(a, zm, zw ; φ) is given by unique root of the equation 
 
(1 + r)a = φ 
( 
1 −φ + r + δ + δφ 
φ 
 
k φ  max 
m,n,nd,te 
1 
{mγ kν nθ − wnd − cf In >0} 
 
If the max in the RHS is attained with nd > 0, then there are two positive roots of the above 
equation and the set of enforceable levels of capital rental is [k(a, zm, zw ; φ), k(a, zm, zw ; φ)], 
where k(a, zm, zw ; φ) represents the smallest root. Nonetheless, the optimal production plan of 
the entrepreneur coincides with the solution to the individual problem subject to the simpler 
limit k ≤ k(a, zm, zw ; φ).  It can also be shown that k(a, zm, zw ; φ) is strictly increasing in 
a, zm, φ and weakly (strictly) increasing in zw (if nd = 0). 
Proof of Proposition 2. The optimal production plan of self-employed individuals solve 
 
πse  = (zmtm)γ kν (zw (1 − tm))θ − (r + δ)k + (1 + r)a + µk (k − k) 
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( 
z 
γ ν 
where γ + ν + θ = 1. The FOC imply: 
γ 
{tm} zγ kν zθ [γtγ−1(1 − tm)θ − tγ θ(1 − tm)θ−1] = 0 ⇒ t∗  = 
m w m m m γ + θ   
  1   
{k} (zmtm)γ νkν−1(zw (1 − tm))θ − r − δ − µk  = 0 ⇒ k = 
( 
(zmtm)γ ν(zw (1 − tm))θ 
1 
1−ν 
r + δ + µk 
Note that the first FOC equates the marginal product of entrepreneurial time at managing 
and worker. Combining the FOC we obtain that the marginal product of entrepreneurial time 
satisfies: 
 
M P Tse = γzγ (t
∗ )γ−1 k∗ν (zw (1 − t∗ ))
θ
 
m m m 
  1   
= rmw 
(
zγ zθ 
) 
γ+θ , 
m  w 
ν    
( 
γ θ 
 
  θ  
1−ν  1 
  ν  
1−ν 
where rmw  = γ ν 1−ν (γ + θ)2 
. 
r + δ + µ 
Income of self-employed individuals can then be written as 
 
yse =   M P tm tm + M P tw tw + M P K k + ra − k(r + δ), 
yse =  M P Tse × 1 + (r + µ + δ)k + ra − k(r + δ), 
  1   yse =  rmw   zγ zθ   γ+θ  + µk + ra. 
m  w 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. An individual with ability (zm, zw ) prefers to be self-employed 
rather than work for a wage if and only if 
  1   zw w + ra <  zγ zθ   θ+γ rmw + µk + ra, 
m  w 
 
which holds when the skill ratio satisfies 
 
 
 
 
 
  1   γ    θ 
 
 
 
θ+γ 
γ 
zw  < 
rmw + µk/ 
m 
 
w
 
zmzw 
θ+γ 
 . 
 
If capital markets are perfect (φ = 1), the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint is 
equal to zero (µ = 0) and the individual prefers to be self-employed rather than work for a 
wage if and only if 
zw  <  
rmw   
zm w 
θ+γ 
γ ≡ R1. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The optimal production plan of employers solves 
 
 
π(zm, zw , a)   =   M axtm,tw ,nd,k (zmtm) k 
k ≤ k 
 
tm + tw = 1, 
tw ≥ 0. 
(nd + zw tw )θ — wnd − (r + δ)k + (1 + r)a 
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The non-negativity constraint on tw ensures that managerial time cannot be bigger than 1. 
Associate the multiplier µk to the borrowing constraint, µt to the time constraint, and µtw to 
the non-negative constraint on the working time. The FOC of the problem imply 
 
M P K =  (zmtm)γ νkν−1(nd + zw tw )θ = r + δ + µk , 
M P nd =  (zmtm)γ kν θ(nd + zw tw )θ−1 = w, 
M P tm =  zmγ(zmtm)γ−1kν (nd + zw tw )θ = µt, 
M P tw =  (zmtm)γ θkν (nd + zw tw ))θ−1zw = µt − µtw , 
 
where we have assumed that parameters are such that it is optimal to hire outside labor 
(nd > 0). Combining the FOC we obtain: 
wzw = M P tw ≤ M P tm, with equality only if tw > 0. 
We divide the analysis in two steps. 
Step 1 : We first show that if the borrowing constraint does not bind (µk = 0), then the 
entrepreneur allocate all his time to managerial tasks (tw = 0, tm = 1). Assume that µk = 0 
and let L ≡ nd + zw (1 − tm). Furthermore, to find a contradiction assume that tw > 0. Then, 
µtw = 0 implies M P tm = M P tw so that 
 
 γL zmγL = tmzmθzw → tm = θz
 
 
. (12) 
 
Combining the FOC for MPK and M P nd, gives 
( 
w ν L  
\ν
 
(zmtm)γ    
(r + δ) θ 
 
 
 
θLθ−1 = w. (13) 
 
Combining (12)-(13) gives   
 
Lγ+θ+ν−1 
 
 
( 
zmγ 
\γ ( wν 
 
 
\ν 
θ = w, (14) 
θzm θ(r + δ) 
 
which is false in general given that γ + θ + ν − 1 = 0. We conclude that if the borrowing con- 
straint does not bind, then an employer optimally choose to devote all his time to managerial 
tasks. 
Step 2 : Assume that the borrowing constraint binds (k = k). We now show that there 
exists a threshold level of assets a∗(zm, zw ) such that the optimal production plan features 
tw > 0 if a < a∗(zm, zw ) and tw = 0 if a > a∗(zm, zw ). Thus, if the borrowing constraint is not 
too tight, employers allocate all their time to managerial activities. We now find conditions 
for which tm < 1(or, equivalently, tw > 0). Note that tm < 1 only if µtw = 0. In this case, the 
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marginal product of entrepreneurial time is equated across the two uses of time. From the 
FOC it can be obtained that 
M P tw = M P tm ⇒ L = 
 
θzw tm . 
γ 
 
Plugging L into the FOC with respect to labor demand and solving for tm gives an expression 
for the optimal fraction of time dedicated to managerial tasks: 
 
 
tm = 
1 
θzγ k
ν ( 
γ 
 
     1   \1−θ  1−γ−θ 
. 
w zw θ 
 
Note that tm < 1 iff 
 
 
k(a, zm, zw ) < k∗(zm, zw ) ≡ 
1  
w 
θzγ 
( 
zw θ 
\1−θ l 
. 
γ 
 
Since k(a, zm, zw ) is increasing in a, the inverse of this function can be used to define a 
threshold level of assets a∗(zm, zw ) such that tm   < 1 if and only if assets are below this 
threshold. Otherwise, tm = 1. 
Step 3 : Compute the marginal product of employers time. From Step 1 and 2, when assets 
are below a∗(zm, zw ) we have M P tm = M P tw = wzw . On the other hand, when assets are 
above a∗(zm, zw ) , tm = 1 and M P tm > M P tw. To obtain an expression for MPtm note that 
the FOC with respect to capital and outside labor imply: 
 
wν 
k = nd 
(r + δ + µk )θ 
 
 
       1   (
θzγ 
( 
wν 1ν \ 1−(ν+θ) 
nd = m    w (r + δ + µk )θ 
 
Plugging k and nd into M P tm = γzγ kν nθ  gives 
m d 
 
 
M P tm = zmγ 
1( 
ν
 
(r + δ + µ) 
 
       1   
\ν ( θ 
\θ  1−(ν+θ) 
w 
 
Proof of Proposition 5.  An individual with ability (zm, zw ) and assets a prefers being 
an employer rather than self-employment if and only if 
 
  1   
mzw  θ+γ rmw + µsekse + ra < zmrm + µeke + ra, 
(
zγ   θ 
 
where µe  and µse  are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the borrowing constraints when 
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the individual is an employer or is self-employed, respectively, and ke  and kse  are the capital 
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) 
z < 
z 
z 
γ 
z 
θ 
used in production at these occupations. This inequality holds when the ability ratio is such 
that 
( 
rm 
rmw 
+ 
(µeke −cf ) 
zmrmw 
−
 
(µsekse) 
1
 
zmrmw 
θ+γ 
θ 
 
   
≡ R2, 
If capital markets are perfect (φ = 1), the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint is 
equal to zero (µ = 0) and the individual prefers to be an employer rather than be self-employed 
if and only if 
zw 
( 
< R2 1 − 
m 
cf 
zmrmw 
θ+γ \ 
θ
 
, where R2 ≡ ( rm 
\ 
rmw 
θ+γ 
θ 
. 
Proof of Proposition 6. When φ = 1 the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing con- 
straint is equal to zero (µ = 0) and occupational choice decisions are independent of asset 
holdings and maximize the marginal product of time. Proposition 4 established that an in- 
dividual with ability (zm, zw ) prefers to be self-employed rather than work for a wage if and 
only if the skill ratio satisfies 
zw 
< R1 
m 
  rmw   
≡ 
w
 
θ+γ 
. 
Assuming that the fixed cost of operation cf = 0, then Proposition 5 implies that an individual 
with ability (zm, zw ) prefers to be entrepreneur instead of self-employed if and only if the skill 
ratio satisfies 
zw 
< R2 
m 
( 
rm 
\ 
≡ 
rmw 
θ+γ 
θ 
. 
If parameters are such that R2 < R1, then self-employment is dominated by either being an 
employer or a worker. The optimal occupational choice is to be an employer if and only if 
zm w 
zw  > rm . Otherwise, the optimal occupational choice is to work for a wage. When employers 
incur a fixed cost of operation, being an employer is preferred to being self-employed if and 
only if 
  1   
mzw   1−ν  rmw < (zmrm − cf ) , 
(
zγ   θ 
 
which holds when zw 
m 
r 
rm 
rmw 
 
cf 
— rmw zm 
θ+γ 
. 
